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ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE LOTTERY
BROADCAST PROVISION
AD iNISTPATIVE action designed to control program content has long been
the most controversial aspect of government regulation of radio broadcasting.
The controversy stems primarily from the failure of Congress to indicate pre-
cisely whether, or to what extent, the Federal Communications Commission
is empowered to supervise the program service of broadcasters.
Since access to radio broadcasting as a means of mass communication is
peculiarly circumscribed by the limited number of transmission frequencies,'
a rational method for allocating these frequencies to broadcasters and for su-
pervising their use is essential to maximum utilization of this medium. Recog-
nizing this necessity,2 Congress has declared all broadcast channels to be public
property,3 and has charged the Federal Communications Commission with the
duty of protecting the public interest in the use of those channels: To enable
the Commission to discharge this responsibility, Congress has vested it with
exclusive power to grant permits for the construction of commercial trans-
mitting facilities 5 and to license broadcasters to operate over assigned fre-
quencies.6 Exercise of these powers to regulate the technological phases of
radio broadcasting is concededly a Commission function.7 There is sharp
1. 'While the total number of commercial broadcasting stations-AMf, FM1 and TV-
has tripled in the past three years, the demand for these types of transmitting facilities
still exceeds the number of available channels. 14 FCC Amv. REP. 1-46 (194S). For non-
technical discussions of the physical aspects of radio broadcasting and the current allo-
cation of frequencies, see FCC, RADIO, A PuBLIC Paimra (1940) ; NVAMMn, RADIO Alm
TELEvISlON LAw 221-7 (1948). It is possible, of course, that future scientific develop-
ments, by expanding the frequency spectrum or by maldng possible simultaneous trans-
missions over one frequency, may remove the unique physical characteristic of radio
which has provided the essential justification for contemporary program controls. See
Comx,ssiox oN Fpazmuo OF TrE PREss, A FREE AND RFssPozs.Mu PRass 33 (1947).
2. Communications Act of 1934 §§ 1, 301, 4S STAT. 1064, 1031 (1934), as amended,
50 STAT. 189 (1937), 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 301 (1946) (hereinafter referred to only as the
Communications Act). See also SEN. REP. No. 772, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1926) (dis-
cussing the objectives of the Radio Act of 1927, predecessor of the present act).
3. Communications Act § 301.
4. While rejecting the system of government operation adopted by most other nations,
Congress has likewise discarded free competition as a method for exploiting the medium
of radio communication. Instead, private broadcasters are licensed to operate over as-
signed channels for three year periods. 47 CODE FED. Rzcs. § 3.34 (Supp. 1943). Grant
or renewal of franchise depends upon a showing that the public interest will be served
thereby. Communications Act § 307.
5. Communications Act § 319.
6. Communications Act §§ 307, 309 (a).
7. .... [T]he government has to license because of the technical nature of the indus-
try.... It gets in on all the technical phases." Hcarings before Committce oi Intcrstate
Commerce on S. 814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1943) (statement of Neville Miller,
president of National Association of Broadcasters). An enumeration of the regulatory
functions of the FCC may be found in 14 FCC ANN. REP. 25 (1948).
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disagreement, however, as to whether it was the sense of the legislators that
the public interest was to be served by permitting unfettered private discretion
in selection of program content, or whether the FCC was to hold licensees to
an obligation to present the type of program matter it conceived to be most
beneficial to the public.
Broadcasters, relying on a specific statutory provision prohibiting censor-
ship by the FCC,8 naturally espouse the more restrictive conception of the
agency's functions.9 The Commission, on the other hand, has construed its
responsibility as trustee of the public interest as requiring not only policing of
the broadcast channels to prevent interference with radio transmission, but
also as imposing an affirmative duty to insure that broadcasters exploit their
privilege in a manner beneficial to the public welfare.'0 Implicit in this con-
ception of the Commission's functions is an obligation to require satisfactory
program service from licensees, since exercise of the broadcasting franchise
affects the public primarily through the matter transmitted. To secure such
service, the Commission has considered itself empowered to deny or revoke
licenses on the basis of evaluations of program service in terms of contribu-
tion to the public welfare." From this power has evolved a method of gen-
eral program supervision whereby the Commission, by merely expressing dis-
approval of particular programming practices in its opinions in licensing pro-
ceedings or in unofficial pronouncements, has in effect prescribed standards
to which broadcasters are virtually compelled to conform through the implied
threat that failure to comply may result in loss of franchise.
1 2
8. Section 326 of the Communications Act provides that "Nothing in this Act shall
be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over tie
radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with
the right of free speech by means of radio communication."
9. See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROAICASTERS, BROADCASTING AND THE
BIlL OF RIGHTS (1947).
10. "[The] wave lengths belong to the public, and there is a duty inherent that the
operation on those wave lengths must be in the public interest." Hearings before Com-
nittee on Interstate Commerce on S. 814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1943). ". .. [T]i10
Commission has a statutory responsibility for the public interest, of which it cannot
divest itself." FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES OF BROADCAST LIcENSE.ES 55
(1946).
11. "... [T]he Commission believes it is entitled to consider the program service
rendered by the various applicants, to compare them, and to favor those who render the
best service." 2 FRC ANN. REP. 161 (1928), specifically reaffirmed in FCC, PuBLIO
SERvIcE REsPoNsiarry OF BROADCAST LICENSEES 9-12 (1946). See also 7 FCC ANN.
REP. 27 (1941).
12. The FCC has interpreted its duty to weigh the effect of a license grant on the
public interest as permitting only comparative evaluation of the overall program service
of competing applicants. FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBIITY OF BROADCAST LICENS-
Es 54-5 (1946). Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 814, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. 43-4 (1943). But in appraising overall service the FCC has, of ne-
cessity, specified the particular types of programs which have been weighed adversely
in arriving at a general evaluation. See note 16 infra. Since the courts have afforded
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While claiming and occasionally exercising broad regulatory powers, the
FCC, chastened by charges of censorship, has proceeded cautiously into the
area of program supervision.13 Although measures directed at controlling the
program service of broadcast licensees may serve to discharge the Commis-
sion's obligation to the public, they are also a source of potential conflict with
the statutory ban against censorship and with the constitutional guarantee of
free speech-a conflict which the courts have never definitively reconciled. 4
the Commission broad discretion to determine what types of broadcasting activity are in
the public interest, see, e.g., FCC v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223 (1946), the deterrent effect
of such expressions of disapproval is virtually equivalent to a flat pronouncement that
presentation of these types of programs may be grounds for withdrawal of license.
See, e.g., note 88 infra.
The Federal Radio Commission, predecessor to the FCC, revoked the licenses of
two stations solely on the ground that they were presenting programs detrimental to
the public interest, and in each instance was upheld. KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC,
47 F2d 670 (App.D.C. 1931) (dubious medical advice); Trinity Methodist Church,
South, v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (App.D.C. 1932) (outspoken verbal attacks on local
dignitaries). While operating under identical statutory provisions, the FCC has re-
jected the device of revocation before license expiration and has used renewal pro-
ceedings as the forum for reviewing program service. For general discussions of FCC
program supervision, see Segal, Recent Trends in Censorship of Radiobroadcast Pro-
grams, 20 Rocv MT. L. REv. 366 (1948); Comment, Radio Program Controls: A
Network of Inadequacy, 57 YALE L. J. 275 (1947) ; Note, Govenment Control of the
Contents of Radio Programs, 47 COL. . R-v. 1041 (1947). See also "V=amz, RADio
ArD TmEavisioN LAw, c. III (1948). Yet the FCC stoutly maintains that "We have
not exercised either a negative or affirmative control over any program or proposed
program." Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 814, 78th Cong,
1st Sess. 25 (1943) (Statement of Commissioner Fly, then Chairman of the FCC). But
see, e.g., note 16 infra.
13. See, e.g., SIFPmANN', RADIO'S SECOND CHANCE 10 (1946). [.. T]he FCC is
distinguished, so far, more for its acts of omission than those of commission. It has
the meekness of the lamb, the pace and caution of the tortoise, rather than the rapacity
and the swift spring of the wolf." See also Comment, Radio Program Controls: A
Network of Inadequacy, 57 YAIx L. J. 275 (1947).
14. The FCC's view is not only that the Commission exercises no control over pro-
grams (see note 12 supra), but more specifically that it "exercises no power of
censorship over radio communications. Thus it neither requires the broadcasting of
particular programs nor bans them; program selection is in the first instance the func-
tion of the broadcasters licensed to operate stations." 7 FCC Aim. RT. 27 (1941).
This conception of censorship only as a direct prior restraint was indorsed by the
courts in the two instances in which actions of the Federal Radio Commission were
attacked as censorial. See KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F2d 670, 672
(App.D.C. 1931); Trinity Methodist Church, South, v. FRC, 62 Fa2d 850, 853 (App.).C.
1932). It would seem, however, that this view conflicts with the Supreme Court's
declaration that immunity from previous restraint "cannot be deemed to exhaust the
conception of the liberty guaranteed by state and federal constitutions.' Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697, 714-5 (1931).
Whatever the accurate definition of censorship, judicial confusion as the extent
to which the FCC may control program service is still evident. Compare FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940) ("The Commission is given
no supervisory control of the programs .... In short, the broadcasting field is open to
1949]
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Confronted with this apparent dilemma, the FCC has imposed few effective
restraints on programming practices, 15 and has reproved only the most objec-
tionable types of program subject matter.16 Determination of program con-
tent has been left largely to the discretion of the broadcasters.
1
CONTROL OF THE GIVEAWAYS
One of the FCC's boldest projects for control of program subject matter
was outlined in a recent Commission announcement'8 proposing the promulga-
tion of rules calculated to ban many of the currently numerous and successful
giveaway programs.19 The proposed action is of interest not only because
anyone, provided there be an available frequency over which he can broadcast without
interference to others, if he shows his competency, the adequacy of his equipment, and
financial ability to make good use of the assigned channel."), with National Broadcast-
ing Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943) ("But the Act does not restrict the
Commission merely to supervision of the [radio] traffic. It puts upon the Commission
the burden of determining the composition of that traffic.")
The confusion essentially arises from a failure or unwillingness to acknowledge
frankly the supervisory effect of FCC appraisal of program service in licensing, and
to test such action against the statutory and constitutional bars against governmental
restraints on free speech. If the supervisory character of such action were conceded,
the action would still seem valid in the light of the statutory prohibition against censor-
ship, since this provision was copied directly from the Radio Act of 1927, 44 STAT.
1162 (1927), after the Federal Radio Commission, with judicial approval, had asserted
the same authority under the latter provision. See notes 11 and 12 supra. Whether this
type of program supervision squares with the First Amendment still seems an open
question.
15. See, e.g., Comment, Radio Program Controls: A Network of Inadequacy, 57
YALE L. J. 275, 294 (1947); SIEPMANN, op. cit. supra note 13, at 68. As distinct
from criteria directly concerned with the subject matter of individual programs, the
FCC has established standards governing the general programming policies of broad-
casters dealing with matters such as excessive reliance on sponsored network programs.
These standards have been expounded for the most part in the so-called Blue Book.
FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAs T LxcNsrms (1946).
16. Examples are: (1) programs offensive to religious sensibilities; (2) personal
attacks or defamatory statements; (3) fortune-telling; (4) solicitation of funds; (5)
offensive children's programs; (6) astrology; (7) false or misleading advertising. See
WARNm, RADIO AND TELEvISION LAW, C. III (1948); LANDRY, WHO, WHAT, WhY 1S
RADIO? 52 (1942) ; Note, Radio Censorship and the Federal Commzunications Co0mis-
sion, 39 COL. L. Rv. 447 (1939).
17. See Comment, Radio Program Controls: A Network of Inadequacy, 57 YA=
L. J. 275 (1947); FCC, PUBLIC SERViCE REsPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LxcnnszEs 54-6
(1946).
18. FCC, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Docket No. 9113, 13 FFm. REa. 4748
(1948); FCC, Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 13 FED. REG. 5075
(1948). Hearings were held on the proposal on Oct. 19, 1948, but a decision has not
yet been rendered.
19. Giveaway programs can be defined comprehensively only as programs involving
some type of scheme whereby a limited number of prizes are awarded to members of
the studio or listening audiences. While the first of these programs, Pot O'Gold, ap-
peared on a major network about ten years ago, it is only within the past two years
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of its potential impact on the radio industry, but also because it raises unique
problems both as to the Commission's jurisdiction to undertake any action
with respect to this type of program and as to the specific technique which may
be employed to effect control.
In addition to the public interest standard of the general licensing provi-
sions, under which the Commission has evolved its own criteria for appraising,
and effectively supervising, program service, Congress has imposed several
specific statutory restraints on private discretion in determination of program
content by prohibiting particular types of program matter.20 While in the
case of most of these standards Congress has failed to provide specific en-
forcement power for the FCC,2 1 the Commission has, nevertheless, occa-
sionally sought to implement them.2 2  The Commission, however, has given
no clear indication as to whether it regarded the specific provisions as them-
selves authorizing these actions or as merely indicating standards for the ad-
ministration of its general licensing function.2 In its proposed attack on the
that this genre has become one of radio's most popular forms of entertainment. U.S.
News, Aug. 20, 1948, p. 19. The great variety of radio giveaway schemes is indicated in
an article describing the formats of all the network giveaways in Radio Album Maga-
zine, Spring, 1949, p. 65. Forty such programs are carried by the four major networhs,
while probably several hundred more are being presented by individual stations. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 6, 1948, p. 1, col. 6. Many of these would be barred by the Commission's
proposed rules. See note 25 infra. For discussions of the entertainment value and
popular appeal of the giveaways, see, e.g., James, The Radio Gkeawass, 67 m Lim-
cuy 430 (1948) ; Gould, Jack Benny or Jachpot, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1943, § 6, p. 16.
20. Prior to Sept. 1, 1948, the sections of the Communications Act specifically re-
lating to the contents of radio programs were the following: (1) § 315, requiring broad-
casters to offer equal facilities to opposing candidates for public office; (2) § 316, for-
bidding the broadcast of information relating to lotteries, gift enterprises or similar
schemes; (3) § 317, requiring that all sponsored programs be announced as such; (4)
§ 325(a), forbidding the rebroadcast of another station's program w:ithout the express
authorization of that station; (5) § 326, the last sentence of which forbids the broad-
cast of obscene, indecent or profane language. On Sept. 1, 1943, Section 316 and the
last sentence of Section 326 were removed from the Communications Act and placed
in the Criminal Code. See note 24 infra.
21. The FCC is required to effectuate Section 315 through the promulgation of
rules and regulations. Former Sections 316 and 326 were, and in their present form
are, phrased as penal provisions with no specific reference to Commission responsibility
for enforcement. Sections 317 and 325(a) are merely cast in prohibitive phrascolo-
with no reference to the means of enforcement. However, they acquire the force of
criminal sanction through Section 501, which declares the breach of any prohibitive
or compulsive provision of the Act to be a penal offense.
22. See notes 35, 53 and 55 infra.
23. Typical is the decision in ,RBL Radio Station, 2 F.C.C. 6S7 (1936), in which
the Commission concluded that a program broadcast by an applicant for license renewal
violated both Section 316 and a state anti-lottery law. Although suggesting that such
conduct did not appear to advance the public interest, the Commission finally granted
renewal because of otherwise meritorious service. In general, the FCC appears to have
considered transgressions of these proscriptive statutory provisions in the name way
in which it has weighed conduct improper only because the FCC has found it detrimental
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giveaways, the FCC, rather than relying solely on the touchstone of public
interest, has drawn statutory support from the provision declaring the broad-
cast of lotteries to be a criminal offense-a provision originally enacted as
Section 316 of the Communications Act of 1934, but recently transferred to
Section 1304 of the Criminal Code in an omnibus recodification measure -4
While the precise theory by which jurisdiction is asserted is not fully ex-
plained, the Commission's proposal is clearly predicated on the premise that
many giveaway programs violate the lottery broadcast provision," and that the
Commission is empowered to utilize its administrative weapons to prevent the
broadcast of such illicit programs. 26
To effect the stricture against lottery broadcasts, the FCC apparently in-
tends to abandon the informal supervisory technique of enunciating and en-
forcing program standards by indirection, preferring the formal promulga-
tion of rules spelling out the norms which the Commission will employ to
identify lottery broadcasts. 27  While the proposed rules are cast in purely
to the public interest. In view of this fact, a former General Counsel of the FRC com-
mented that "Congress might as well have spared itself the trouble of enacting
the specific provisions .... The Commission would have arrived at the same result
anyway, and in most cases, by the use of the vague standard, has greatly expanded the
prohibitions found in the statute." Caldwell, Legal Restrictions on the Contents of
Broadcast Programs, 9 Ant L. REV. 229, 237 (1938). On the other hand, it may well
be argued that failure to recognize specifically a direct duty of enforcement in the
Commission has vitiated the statutory prohibitions and has resulted in a cautious and
uncertain enforcement policy which has checked only the most gross infractions of these
provisions. See, e.g., Comment, Radio Program Controls: A4 Network of Inadequacy,
57 Y. im L. J. 275, 287 (1947).
24. Pub. L. No. 772, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 25, 1948, effective Sept. 1, 1948).
25. The FCC's proposal declares that the Commission will consider a program to be
a lottery if valuable prizes are awarded on the basis of chance to winners who are re-
quired (1) "to furnish any money or thing of value or are required to have in their
possession any product sold, manufactured, furnished or distributed by a sponsor of a
program broadcast on the station in question; or (2) . . . to be listening to or viewing
the program in question on a radio or television receiver; or (3) . . . to answer cor-
rectly a question, the answer to which is given on a program broadcast over the station
in question or where an aid to answering the question correctly is given on a program
broadcast over the station in question [prior broadcast of a question to be considered
an aid in answering] ... ; or (4) ... to answer the phone or write a letter if the
phone conversation or contents of the letter . . . are broadcast by the station." FCC,
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 18, Appendix.
This definition embodies the three factors long accepted as essential to a finding
that a particular scheme is a lottery-prize, chance and consideration. Post Publishing
Co. v. Murray, 230 Fed. 773 (1st Cir. 1916) ; Horner v. United States, 147 U.S. 449
(1893). The question of the accuracy of the FCC's classification of these types of pro-
grams as lotteries is beyond the scope of this comment.
26. "These proposed rules are designed to assist the Commission, licensees, and
other interested persons in giving effect to the public policy embodied in the determina-
tion of Congress that the United States should not 'permit any radio station licensed and
regulated by the government to engage in any such unlawful practices [the broadcast
of lotteries].'" FCC, Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 18, § 4.
27. See FCC, Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rule Making, sutra note 18, § 5.
[Vol. 58: 10931098
LOTTERY BROADCAST PROVISION
definitional phraseology, they manifestly embody the Commission's determina-
tion to enforce them by administrative action.
Both the FCC's claim to jurisdiction over lottery broadcasts and its pro-
posed method of administrative enforcement have been challenged as exceed-
ing the Commission's authority.28 The basic objection to the Commission's
assertion of jurisdiction is that since Section 1304 is a criminal provision con-
taining no specific delegation of correlative enforcement powers to the FCC,
criminal prosecution is the exclusive means of compelling broadcasters to re-
frain from transmitting lottery programs.- Opponents of the FCC's pro-
posal further contend that even if the Commission were empowered to en-
force the lottery broadcast provision, it could do so only by considering viola-
tions of that provision in passing on license applications, and could not enact
rules embodying its definition of lottery broadcasts3 0-the argument running
that such rules would be a direct means of enforcing Section 1304 of the
Criminal Code, while the Commission is confined to making rules "to carry
out the provisions of this Act."31  The succeeding discussion will be con-
cerned with analyzing these two aspects of the Commission's proposal,




While the broadcast of lotteries has been outlawed for fifteen years, the
questions of whether the FCC has authority to effect that prohibition, and, if
it has, what the nature of that authority is, have never been settledPes None-
theless, the Commission, even when preaching its lack of actual enforcement
power,3 has in practice enforced the lottery broadcast provision by occasional
28. AammcA BROADCASTING CO., BRIEF IN OPFosrnoI TO THE Prtpoosrm Ru Ias
(Sept. 24, 1948). Seven other briefs were submitted in opposition to the proposal and
one in favor. The ABC brief presented the most comprehensive argument against the
Commission's assertion of jurisdiction.
29. ABC, BRIEF, supra note 28, at 5-11.
30. Id. at 19-32.
31. Communications Act§4(i).
32. While the accuracy of the FCC's definition of types of lottery programs, s;pra
note 25, has been vigorously challenged, e.g., ABC, BRIE., Mipra note 28, at 33-56, a
more fundamental question is Whether the FCC would have authority to issue the pro-
posed rules if the requirement as to definitional accuracy were met either in that
(a) the FCC's definition of lotteries did in fact correspond with the criminal defini-
tion or (b) it was not required so to correspond. See p. 1106 infra.
33. The courts have never considered this problem. Opinions of commentators
have differed: compare VARmEm, RADIO AND T-.uvmsio:z LAW 341 (1948) (FCC
should take no action with respect to lottery broadcasts); Hearings before Conm.itee
on Interstate Commerce on H.R. 5497, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 644-6 (1942) (only ad-
judicated violations of the lottery broadcast provision may be considered in licensing
proceedings) ; SocoLow, LAw oF RADIO BROADCASTING 839, 1023-5 (1939) (FCC may
consider unadjudicated violations).
34. ". .. [C]ases which involve violation of the specific injunction against pro-
grams containing lottery information ... are investigated by the Commission and re-
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consideration of violations in licensing proceedings 3 and by "discouraging"
offenders through informal expressions of disapproval30 With the recent
mushrooming of the giveaways, however, the Commission has found it
necessary to take an affirmative stand in order to meet the problem head on. 17
An important consideration in evaluating the FCC's claim to jurisdiction is
whether that agency can best effectuate the statutory ban against the broad-
cast of lotteries.38 Since these broadcasts are denominated crimes, the De-
partment of Justice may, of course, enforce the provision by prosecuting of-
fenders. But criminal prosecution as a means of inhibiting such offenses, as
with "white collar" crimes generally,3 9 has not proven adequate.40 The more
ferred to the prosecuting authorities for appropriate action." 6 FCC ANN. Rra. 55-6
(1940).
35. In two instances the FCC found that programs broadcast by applicants for re-
newal of license were lotteries, but granted renewal in view of otherwise meritorious
service. WRBL Radio Station, 2 F.C.C. 687 (1936) (see supra note 23) ; KXL Broad-
casters, 4 F.C.C. 186 (1937). In one competitive licensing proceeding there was indica-
tion that violation of the radio lottery provision was one of the grounds for denial of
license to an applicant. Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp., 5 F.C.C. 501 (1938), 8 F.C.C.
557 (1941). Since initiating its investigation of the giveaways in 1946, the Commission
has sidestepped the issue of lottery broadcasts in licensing proceedings. Capital Broad.
casting Co., 3 PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 310 (1946); Coastal Broadcasters, 4 Pnui &
FlscHmi RADIO REG. 751 (1948).
36. This has been accomplished primarily through the manner in which the FCC has
handled the numerous complaints from listeners and persons otherwise concerned that
particular programs are lotteries. 6 FCC ANN. RPs. 57 (1940). When the misconduct
charged in a complaint has appeared of sufficient seriousness to the FCC, it has either
initiated an investigation, or, more commonly, called the objection to the attention of the
broadcaster with some indication of the Commission's concern. Ibid. In view of the
FCC's avowed disapproval of lottery broadcasts, see note 35 supra, a licensee generally
discontinues a practice upon learning of the complaint and the Commission's attitude rather
than risk full investigation and its attendant publicity or even loss of license. Hearings
before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 5497, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess.644-5 (1942).
37. To stress its new determination to cope with the giveaways, the Commission,
simultaneously with the announcement of the proposal to enact lottery broadcast rules,
released a Hearing Examiner's report recommending that a declaratory ruling be issued
pronouncing a program which had been investigated to be a violation of the radio lottery
provision. Northern Virginia Broadcasters, 4 PIKE & FIscHER RADIO RwO. 660 (Aug. 5,
1948). The Commission, however, retreated from the ground on which these initial
assertions of jurisdiction were based upon discovery that Section 316, on which both
actions rested, had been removed to the Criminal Code a month previously. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 22, 1948, p. 1, col. 8; FCC, Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rule Making, note
18 supra.
38. See p. 1097 supra.
39. See Sutherland, White Collar Criminality, 5 Am. SOCIOLOGICAL R.v. 1 (1940)
and Sutherland, Crime and Business, 217 ANNALS OF Am. AcAD. OF PoL & Soc. SCIENCE
112, 113-4 (1941).
40. There has never been a criminal prosecution for violation of the lottery broadcast
provision. While the FCC in passing on license applications has formally declared three
programs to be violations of Section 316, see note 35 supra, no steps were taken toward
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effective and expeditious way to prevent the broadcast of lotteries would ap-
pear to be recognition of a parallel duty of enforcement in the specialized
agency primarily responsible for implementing public radio policy. Certainly
'FCC authority to check such broadcasts would not expose broadcasters to
extraordinary administrative control, since the Commission imposes identical
restraints upon the transmission of matter presumably less socially harmful
than that stigmatized as criminal.41 Opponents of the FCC's proposal have
not contended that administrative enforcement of the lottery broadcast pro-
vision would be ineffective or inadvisable, but rather maintain only that Con-
gress has not, in fact, granted authority to the Commission to undertake such
action.4 2
Congress's failure to delegate administrative enforcement powers specifi-
cally to the FCC necessitates closer analysis of the statutory sources of the
Commission's authority to determine whether its assertion of jurisdiction is
tenable. Two grounds are available on which the Commission may seek to es-
tablish its claim. On the one hand, it may contend that enforcement authority
is derived directly from Section 316 of the Communications Act, and that the
recent transfer of that section to the Criminal Code has not altered the man-
date. 4 3 Alternatively, the Commission may assert that its duty to license
criminal prosecution of the offenders. In 1940, the FCC did request the Department of
Justice to prosecute the broadcasters of seven programs which the Commission believed
were violative of Section 316. The Department refused to institute prosecutive action,
but significantly refrained from stating that this decision was based on a belief that the
programs were not lotteries. 4 FzD. Coar. B.n j. 169, 195 (1940). Experience under the
postal lottery statute, see note 50 infra, similarly reveals that enforcement responsibility
has been assumed primarily by the Postal Department rather than the Department of
Justice. See, e.g., Communication to the YALE LAW JOURn:AL from the Office of the
Solicitor, Post Office Dept., May 31, 1949.
The inaction of the criminal enforcement authorities might be explained in several
ways: that the vastness of the area of conduct they must patrol makes possible prosecution
only of the most gross offenses; that the difficulty of obtaining conviction for misconduct
of this type, which carries no particular moral stigma, warrants prosecution only of the
most culpable violations; that the prosecuting officials rely on administrative regulation as
the first line of attack ori activity of this type; and finally, that the Department of Justice
believes there have been no violations.
41. See notes 12 and 16 supra.
42. See briefs submitted in opposition to the proposed rules, note 23 supra.
43. This ground was initially advanced by the Commission in the original Notice of
Proposed Rule Maldng, mpra note 18, § 2, and in the Hearing E.-mminer's report in
Northern Virginia Broadcasters, 4 Pim & Fxscuan RAuDIo RE-. 660 (194)-based, how-
ever, on the erroneous belief that Section 316 v.as still part of the Communications Act.
This ground, implicit in the original notice, was made explicit in the Hearing Examiners
report by the pronouncement that "The respondent's conduct is not here under scrutiny
to determine the merit or lack of merit, from the standpoint of public interest, convenience
and necessity, in the particular program called in question in the respondent's overall
program service. ... [O]ur discussion is limited solely to the challenged program in
relation to the anti-lottery provision of the Communications Act." 4 Pum & Fisc=a
RAglo REG. 660,666 (1948).
19491
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
broadcasters in the public interest requires denial of licenses to applicants who
fail to comply with the public policy expressed in the radio lottery provision
of the Criminal Code." As theories of jurisdiction these two grounds essen-
tially differ only on the conceptual level, since affirmation of either would
have the practical consequence of acknowledging the Commission's authority
to take action which would effectively restrain the broadcast of lotteries.
Apart from the conceptual difference, the latter ground might, if accepted,
be construed as limiting the Commission to seeking enforcement by exercise
of its licensing power.
45
Jurisdiction through Section 1304
The legislative history of the lottery broadcast provision appears to support
the view that the FCC was directly empowered to effectuate that section of the
Communications Act. A clause in the original draft of Section 13 of H.R.
7716,46 from which Section 316 was directly copied,47 provided that "no
radio station license shall be suspended or revoked on account of any such
violation [of the lottery broadcast provision]." This clause was deleted by
unanimous vote in the Senate, and the bill in this amended form was passed
by both houses.4 8 Senate discussion of the motion to delete this clause empha-
sized the legislators' intent that the FCC should compel compliance with the
lottery broadcast provision by denying licenses to transgressors.40 While ob-
viously buttressing the claim to jurisdiction derived indirectly through the
licensing powers, these expressions of legislative purpose also imply recogni-
tion of a direct responsibility of the Commission to effectuate the radio lottery
provision. And of equal significance are Congressional statements that Sec-
tion 316 was intended to grant the FCC the same authority to prevent dissem-
ination of lottery information by radio as had been specifically delegated to
the postmaster to exclude such matter from the mails.50 That this expressed
44. When the removal of Section 316 was called to the FCC's attention, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 22, 1948, p. 1, col. 6, the Commission hastily shifted to this jurisdictional base. FCC,
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 18, §§ 3, 4 (Aug. 26, 1948).
45. See note 98 infra.
46. 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933).
47. See Conference Report on Communications Act of 1934, H.R. REP. No. 1918, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1934).
48. Subsequently to be pocket-vetoed by President Hoover.
49. Senator George, in presenting the motion to delete this clause, said, "... [F]or
repeated or continued violations, the license of a broadcasting station might well and
properly be revoked. With this language in the provision the power to revoke even for
flagrant violations would be denied." 76 CoNG. Rxc. 3767-8 (1933). Senator Dill, chair-
man of the committee reporting the bill, expressly concurred in this affirmation of the
FCC's authority under the radio lottery provision. Ibid.
50. Transmission of lottery information through the mails is a criminal offense.
18 U.S.C. § 1302 (1948). But in addition to criminal prosecution as a means of enforce-
ment, Congress has provided for parallel administrative enforcement action by specifically
empowering the postmaster to bar lottery information from the mails. 39 U.S.C. § 259
(1946) and to forbid payment of postal money orders to persons conducting lotteries. 39
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intent was embodied in the text of the Communications Act is demonstrated by
the several sections which confirm FCC responsibility for effectuating all
provisions of the Act."
The FCC's claim to jurisdiction under Section 316 finds further support in
analogous exercises of power by the Commission. Sections 317 and 321 of
the Communications Act, requiring identification of sponsored programs and
prohibiting unauthorized rebroadcast of another station's programs, contain
no specific delegation of enforcement authority to the FCC. Under Section
501 penal sanctions are provided for violation of these sections. Yet the
Commission has compelled compliance -with these provisions both by issuing
rules specifically defining proscribed practices52 and by weighing infractions
in licensing proceedings.5 The provision declaring the broadcast of obscenity
to be a criminal offense-formerly part of Section 326, but, like Section 316,
recently removed to the Criminal Code4likewise makes no specific grant of
enforcement power to the FCC. The Commission, nevertheless, has assumed
primary responsibility for enforcement of this provision both by exercise of
its licensing powers55 and by the informal methods of investigation and warn-
U.S.C. § 732 (1946). Despite the absence of specific delegation, there is evidence that
Congress intended to grant equivalent powers to the FCC to check the broadcast of lot-
teries. Section 316 was explicitiy designed after the postal lottery provision. SFn-. REP.
No. 1045, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933). See Haley, The Broadcasting and Postal Lottery
Statutes, 4 GEo. VAsH. L. REv. 475 (1936). Rather than pointing to an intent to maLe
a vital departure from the postal lottery pattern by eliminating administrative enforcement,
Congressional statements suggest that the parallelism includes this essential feature.
".... [T]he broadcast of [lottery] information is unfair to newspapers which are forbidden
the use of the mails if they contain such information... [T]he language of the new
section more nearly places radio stations on the same basis as newspapers in connection
with broadcasting information as to lotteries." SEN. REP. No. 1045, 72d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1933). See also 75 CoNG. Rrc. 3634, 3704 (1932) ; 76 CONG. I. 3767 (1933).
51. Section 303(r) requires the FCC to make rules and regulations "to carry out the
provisions of this Act" Section 403 empowers the Commission to investigate any matter
relating to "the enforcement of any of the provisions of this Act." In the absence of any
constitutional bar to the delegation to the FCC of power to effectuate Section 316, the
clear import of the wording of these provisions would seem to constrain recognition of
enforcement responsibility in the Commission.
52. FCC Regs. 3.189, 3.191, 47 CODE FE. REos. § 3A08 (Cum. Supp. 1933), 47 Coca
FED. REGs. § 3.409 (Supp. 1944), both as recodified by 13 FED. Ruc. 422 (1943).
53. Breach of Section 317 was weighed adversely in Charles C. Carlson, 3 PIKE &
Fxscmm RADIo REG. 1887 (1948); Albuquerque Broadcasting Co., 3 Pxa & Fiscumr
RArno REG. 1320 (1946). Non-compliance with Section 325(a) was considered in A. E.
Newton, 2 F.C.C. 281 (1936).
54. Pub. L. No. 772, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 25, 1943, effective Sept. 1, 1943).
55. Under the Federal Radio Commission revocation of one station's license was
based primarily on violation of § 326, In re Schaeffer, FRC Docket No. 5228 (May 30,
1930), and in another instance a station was placed on probation for use of profanity.
U.S. Daily, Jan. 25, 1930. Broadcast of obscenity was considered by the FCC in Scroggins
& Co. Bank, 1 F.C.C. 194 (1935) ; Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., Docket 2916 (Aug.
6, 1935).
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ing. 5  Although none of the exercises of power under these sections have
received formal judicial approval, they bear such weight as may be ascribed
to established administrative usage.57  Of particular significance is the FCC's
assumption of jurisdiction under Section 326, since that section was re-enacted
unaltered in the Communications Act of 1934 after the Federal Radio Com-
mission had asserted authority under the same provision in the Radio Act of
1927.r8  While the FCC has never precisely expounded the theory oi
jurisdiction on which it based these actions, the resort to measures such as the
promulgation of regulations suggests that the Commission was motivated by a
sense of obligation to effect the purposes of these sections directly.69
Although the above considerations lend weight to the FCC's averment of
jurisdiction derived directly from Section 316, opponents of the Commission's
proposal maintain that removal of that section to the Criminal Code obliterated
any authority the agency might previously have derived from it.60 Courts,
however, have uniformly held that revisions and consolidations of the statutes
do not effect a substantive change in the law unless an intention to that effect
is clearly expressed by the legislature.61 Rather than supplying evidence of
such intent, Congressional reports specifically disavow any purpose to effect
substantive changes by the recodification of the Criminal Code. " Even if
divestment of powers were not considered substantive, it seems unlikely that a
court would construe a legislative act designed merely to achieve a more ra-
tional grouping of statutory provisions within the Criminal Code as altering the
original scheme of enforcement.
Nevertheless, although the FCC initially grounded its lottery broadcast proj-
ect directly on Section 316, it hastily concluded, upon belated discovery of the
56. See, e.g., the FCC's castigation of NBC for the Mae West Adam and Eve
broadcast, WARNER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 338 n.14, and threat of license reprisals to
stations which had carried the program. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1938, p. 1, col. 2.
57. See GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE:r LAw 203-5 (2d ed. 1947); CRAwFoRD, CoX-
sTRucTi N OF STATuTEs 393-4 (1940) (cases cited).
58. The portion of Section 326 of the Communications Act prohibiting obscenity was
copied directly from Section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 STAT. 1172 (1927). The
FRC had asserted effective jurisdiction under Section 29 in two cases prior to the time
it was re-enacted as part of the Communications Act. See note 55 supra. The weight to
be given such legislative confirmation of administrative interpretation of a statute is dis-
cussed in CRAWFORD, op. cit. supra note 57, at 404.
59. Since the regulations relating to sections 317 and 325(a), see note 52 supra,
proscribe defined types of broadcasting activity, and do not merly announce that such
activity Will be deemed contrary to the public interest, they may well be considered to
implement those provisions rather than the licensing provision.
60. ABC, BaIr, supra note 28, at 13.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Ryder, 110 U.S. 729,740 (1884).
62. See SEN. REP. No. 1620, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1948): "The original intent of
Congress is preserved." See also statements by Charles J. Zinn, Law Revision Counsel
to House Committee on Judiciary, emphasizing the fact that no substantive changes in
existing law were intended by the recodification. Hearings before Subcomnsiittce No. 1 of
House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 1600 and H.R. 2055, 80th Cong., 1st Sess (1947).
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transfer of that section,0 that the removal pulled the statutory props from un-
der its original proposal. It therefore issued a supplementary notice shifting
to the general licensing provisions as the statutory basis for its proposed ac-
tion.64
Jurisdictin throzLgh the Licensing Provisions
The Commission may follow either of two lines of reasoning to establish
its authority to weigh infringements of the lottery broadcast provision in con-
sidering applications for licenses. First, the Commission's duty to grant and
renew broadcast licenses so as best to serve the public interest requires ap-
praisal of the "character" qualifications of applicants.r Several court deci-
sions confirm the right of the Commission to view non-compliance with public
policies expressed in other statutes as reflecting detrimentally on the fitness of
an applicant.66 In the case of a criminal statute, the courts have indicated that
non-compliance need not be evidenced by a conviction. 7 Thus the FCC may
soundly assert authority to consider unadjudicated violations of the lottery
broadcast provision as indicating that an applicant is unfit to be entrusted with
a broadcasting franchise.
Second, the Commission, in proceedings to renew or revoke licenses, may
determine that the broadcast of lotteries is a type of program service not in
the public interest; and it may therefore withdraw the license of a broadcaster
who transmits such programs because he has failed to meet the responsibilities
of his trust. Denials of licenses on the basis of evaluations of program service
63. N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1948, p. 1, col. 6.
64. FCC, Supplementary Notice of Proposed Rule faling, supra note 18, § 3, 4.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1948, p. 17, col. 5.
65. Communications Act §308(b); Mester v. United States, 70 F.Supp. 118
(E.D.N.Y. 1947), aff'd, 332 U.S. 749 (1947) ; FCC v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223 (1946).
66. Mlester v. United States, supra note 65 (court upheld FCCs denia of application
for construction permit based in part on ground that applicant had violated the Pure Food
and Drug Act and Price Control Act). See also McLean Trucking Co. v. United States,
321 U.S. 67 (1944) ; Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942). In the latter
case the Court, in negating an NLRB order issued without consideration of the way in
which a criminal statute related to the matter at hand, said; "... . [T]he Board has not been
commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-nmindedly
that it may wholly ignore other and equally important Congressional objectives. Fre-
quently the entire scope of Congressional purpose calls for careful accommodation of
one statutory scheme to another, and it is not too much to demand of an administrative
body that it undertake this accommodation without excessive emphasis upon its im-
mediate task" Id. at 47.
67. In Mester v. United States, .supra note 65, at 122, the court stated that "It might
indeed be most inadvisable from the public viewpoint to entrust the operation of a radio
station to a person ... evidencing disregard for regulatory laws, even though he had
never been convicted of a felony." While the applicants in this instance had been in-
volved in litigation concerning alleged violations of criminal statutes, it hardly seems
probable that this factor would be selected by the courts as a criterion for defining the
ecxtent of an individual's rights or the range of the FCC's administrative discretion. See
also Southern Steamship and McLea cases, note 66 supra.
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in terms of contribution to the public welfare have been upheld even where
the types of program matter stigmatized have not been prohibited by statute.0 8
A fortiori, where a broadcaster transmits a type of subject matter thus pro-
hibited, it would seem that the FCC may safely judge that his operations fall
below the necessary level of public service.
Two points should be noted in connection with the FCC's current contention
that the general licensing provisions provide the source of its jurisdiction over
lottery broadcasts. First, with respect to the second possible rationale for this
claim to jurisdiction-that lottery programs are an unsatisfactory type of
broadcasting service-it should be observed that the Commissin might reach
its judgment as to the effect of such broadcasts on the public without reference
to the radio lottery provision of the criminal code by undertaking to determine
independently that giveaway programs are detrimental to the public interest.09
By so doing, the Commission would avoid the present challenge to its jurisdic-
tion,7 '0 and free itself of the obligation to restrict its attack to those broadcasts
which fall within the criminal definition of lottery.71 But such a determination
would inevitably involve the same moral considerations and evaluation of pub-
lic welfare which weighed in the Congressional decision to ban lottery broad-
casts.72 Rather than ignore this express legislative determination, the FCC
has relied upon the statutory prohibition as the criterion by which it will judge
effect on the public.78 This forthright approach, in addition to exposing the
proposal to technical challenges as to jurisdiction, will probably limit the Com-
mission to action against only those giveaway programs falling under the
criminal ban.
Second, it should be noted that the FCC might frame the proposed rules
either to make denial or revocation of license mandatory upon determination
that a broadcaster has transmitted a lottery, or alternatively, merely to indicate
that the broadcast of lotteries will be weighed adversely in reaching a general
determination as to whether a broadcaster has operated in the public interest.
If jurisdiction is claimed only through the licensing provisions, the latter form
68. See notes 12 and 16 supra.
69. See, e.g., Marks, Legality of Radio Giveaway Programs, 37 GEo. L. 5.
319 (949). This course was followed by the FCC in issuing the Chain Broadcasting
Regulations. See p. 1116 infra.
70. Since the challenge is based on the contention that the FCC is attempting to
enforce the lottery broadcast provision of the Criminal Code, it largely depends on the
FCC's professed reliance on that provision. Without such reliance the Supreme Court's
decision with respect to the Chain Broadcasting Regulations would directly apply. See
p. 1114 infra.
71. The scope of the proposed rules would be limited only by the requirement that the
agency must have reasonable grounds for denial of license and must not censor broadcasts.
On the other hand, if the lottery broadcast provision is the sole basis, it seems clear that
FCC action would be justified only with respect to broadcasts violative of that provision,
See notes 12, 14, and 16 supra.
72. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 69, at 337. See also note 111 infra.
73. See FCC, Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 18, §§ 2, 3.
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would seem preferable, and perhaps required.74 It is very doubtful whether
the FCC can avoid its obligation to pass on the merits of each license applica-
tion by issuing a general statement declaring that a particular type of broad-
casting activity will invariably lead to license withdrawal.t And the non-
mandatory phraseology would probably shield the rules from prior judicial re-
view. 76 Finally, mandatory phrasing would add little to the effectiveness of
the rules, since, as broadcasters are aware, the Commission could give de-
cisive weight to the broadcast of lotteries even though formally considering
such broadcasts only as one factor in arriving at a general evaluation of an
applicant's qualificationsY7
Resort to the general licensing provisions as the statutory basis for the FCC's
proposal, while readily supportable, gives rise to an apparent paradox in that
the Commission, while relinquishing its direct claim to jurisdiction over lottery
broadcasts, is still asserting authority to take action which mill effectively com-
pel broadcasters to comply with the radio lottery provision. This conundrum
sharply points up the dual nature of license reprisals grounded on considera-
74. If, on the other hand, jurisdiction were derived directly from the lottery broadcast
provision, the mandatory form would seem more appropriate, since the FCC would then
be acting to fulfill a direct statutory responsibility to check the broadcast of lotteries.
Under these conditions Section 312(a) of the Communications Act would appear to permit
revocation of license solely because of a lottery broadcast infraction without the neces-
sity of evaluating overall service; and a court might well reason that similar latitude
should be allowed the Commission in refusing renewal.
75. The FCC itself has insisted that denial of license is justified only where there has
been an overall appraisal of the broadcasting service of the applicant. See note 12 mpra.
The judicial attitude is reflected in the Supreme Court's decisions in Columbia Broadcast-
ing System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942) and National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), both dealing with the FCC's Chain Broadcasting
Regulations. See note 99 and page 1114 infra. The Commission provided in those regula-
tions that "No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station" having certain
types of contractual relationships with a network. FCC Regs. 3.101-3.103, adopted 6 Fan.
REG. 2282 (1941), made effective 8 FED. REG. 7355 (1941). While the majority opinion in
the CBS case assumed that this meant automatic denial of license to any station not
complying with the regulations, Justice Frankfurter insisted that this was not true, argu-
ing that "Tnder § 309 of the Communications Act of 1934 the Commission is required to
examine each application for a station license and to determine in each case whether a
grant would serve public interest.... No announcement of general licensing policy can
relieve the Commission of its statutory obligation to e.xanine each application for a li-
cense and determine whether a grant or denial is required by the public interest." 316
U.S. 407, 431-2 (1942). This view was apparently embodied in the majority opinion in
the NBC case. 319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943). It is interesting to note that, despite the word-
ing of the regulations, the FCC insisted that "the applicant's right to a hearing on
the question whether he does in fact propose to operate in the public interest is fully pre-
served." FCC, REPORT ONz CHArN BROADCASTING 85 (1941). In any case, it appears that
the FCC does not intend to cast the proposed rules in imperative phraseology. See FCC,
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 18, L' 2,3.
76. See notes 97 and 99 infra.
77. The FCC has broad discretion in determining whether grant of a license will be
in the public interest. See, e.g., FCC v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223 (1946).
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tion of infractions of the lottery broadcast provision where such action is based
only on the duty to evaluate an applicant's service to the public. On the one
hand, such actions discharge the Commission's responsibility to license broad-
casters as the public interest requires; on the other hand, they have the in-
disputable effect of enforcing the radio lottery provision. Focusing only on
the latter aspect of such actions, opponents of the FCC's proposal may charge
that the Commission is seeking to assert the very jurisdiction which it has re-
nounced by retreating to the general licensing provisions as a statutory base,
and is therefore attempting to usurp the enforcement function which it has
implicitly conceded lies exclusively within the province of the Department of
Justice. While posing a unique semantic problem, it seems unlikely that this
argument will prove persuasive. Courts have never evinced an inclination to
.abrogate administrative acts, otherwise within an agency's authority, merely
because they have the additional effect of compelling individuals to comply
with public policies announced in the criminal statutes.1 8 If the Commission
were to grant a license to a station which it believed was broadcasting a lottery
in violation of Section 1304, it would be knowingly providing an instrument
(the broadcast channel) essential to the conmission of a crime. 0
Thus, the FCC may find authority for administrative action against lottery
broadcasts either in Section 1304 or in the general licensing provisions. The
question remains, however, whether the choice of statutory ground will affect
the availability of enforcement weapons.
ENFORCEMENT WEAPONS
Regulation of the conduct of broadcasters within the terms of the Conmuni-
cations Act is accomplished primarily through the FCC's exclusive power to
grant construction permits and to license broadcasters.8 0 Through its control
over the initial allocation of transmission frequencies the Commission may in-
sure that the broadcasting privilege is entrusted only to persons who meet the
standards prescribed by the Act; and through its power to revoke or refuse
78. See note 66 supra. In addition to charging lack of statutory authorization, oppo-
nents may claim that the FCC's proposal is barred because it calls for the imposition of
"punitive" rather than "remedial" sanctions. This argument rests on an amorphous
"dichotomy" producing uncertain legal consequences. See Gm.LHOltv, ADnINIsTRATIVn
LAW 322-52 (2d ed. 1947). But license reprisals under the Commission's proposal seem
clearly "remedial", since license sanctions have uniformly been so labelled. See, e.g.,
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938). Cf. Steuart & Bro. v. Bowles, 322 U.S.
398 (1944) ; Perkins v. Brown, 53 F. Supp. 176 (S.D. Ga. 1943) ; Nelson v. Secretary of
Agriculture, 131 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1943); Nichols & Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture,
131 F2d 651 (1st Cir. 1942) ; Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 19.10). And even the
characterization "punitive" need not prove fatal, for administrative sanctions so termed
have occasionally been upheld by the courts. See, e.g., Passavant v. United States, 148
U.S. 214 (1893); Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Etling, 287 U.S. 329 (1932). See also GL.-
Hom, .upra, id.
79. See RADIO STATION WITH, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PRoPosED RULts 19
(Sept. 24, 1948).
80. Communications Act §§ 307, 309(a).
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to renew licenses, it may exercise continuing surveillance over the use of the
franchise. In addition to this principal weapon, the Commission has power to
investigate any activities of licensees which it believes may be detrimental to
the public;S1 to issue declaratory rulings based on the findings of investiga-
tions ;S2 to obtain injunctions from district courts to restrain disobedience of
appropriate agency orders ;53 to request the Department of Justice to prosecute
violations of any provisions of the Act ;s and to enact rules and regulations
necessary to the performance of any of its functions.es
Since these weapons are available to the FCC to carry out any of its func-
tions under the Act, the Commission, if it derived jurisdiction directly from
Section 316, could have resorted to this full arsenal to compel compliance with
that provision. And if the FCC remains responsible for enforcement of See-
tion 316 despite its removal,s0 then that removal can hardly have the effect of
diminishing the agency's capacity to effectuate such enforcement.
But if the FCC rests its proposal on the general licensing provisions, it en-
counters the argument that this provision can be enforced only by license
reprisals, and that the Commission is thus foreclosed from using allegedly
independent devices such as the proposed rules to inhibit lottery broadcasts8 7
Accurate appraisal of this contention requires e-amination both of the nature
of the licensing weapon and of the function of the proposed rules.
The Licensing Weapon
Ostensibly, the FCC's basic regulatory process is one whereby standards
prescribed by the Act and by supplementary Commission regulations to govern
the conduct of licensees are enforced through the administrative sanction of
withdrawal of license. But since the essential standard to which licensees must
conform is the FCC's conception of public service, any expression by the
Commission of disapproval of a particular form of broadcasting activity is
viewed by broadcasters as an indication of a specific criterion which will guide
the Commission's licensing policy, and thus, backed by the implied threat of
license reprisals, achieves the stature of an officially indorsed canon.65
81. Communications Act §403. See also Stahlman v. FCC, 126 F.2d 124, 127 (App.
D.C. 1942), " .. [F]ull authority and power is given to the Commission with or without
complaint to institute an inquiry concerning questions arising under the provisiens of the
Act or relating to its enforcement. This, we think includes authority to obtain the infor-
mation necessary to discharge its proper functions, which would embrace an investigation
aimed at the prevention or disclosure of practices contrary to the public interest."
82. Administrative Procedure Act § 5(d), 60 ST.T. 239, 5 U.S.C. § 1004(d) (1946).
83. Communications Act § 401(b).
84. Id. § 401(c).
85. Id.§§4(i),303(r). Seep. 1112infra.
86. See p. 1104 supra.
87. See note 93 infra.
88. "The absolute power of the Commission does not even need the instrument of the
written regulation to assert itself.. "' Even an informal e:pression of opinion by a
Commissioner "is unmistakable notice to all broadcasters that they must ccnform their
operations to such views or face the threat that their licenses may not be renewed."
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Recognizing the strong deterrent effect of unofficial but unequivocal state-
ments as to its conception of broadcasting not in the public interest,89 the Com-
mission has increasingly resorted to this device, rather than formally enacted
rules, as a means of propounding specific standards to govern the conduct of
licensees. 90 Thus, the criteria for measuring the performance of broadcasters
against the touchstone of public interest have been spelled -out by the holdings
or, more commonly, the dicta in Commission opinions in licensing proceedings;
by reports of investigations into particular broadcasting activities; and by
policy statements, press releases, speeches by Commissioners, and letters to
individual licensees.9 These devices have served not only as the vehicles for
expounding standards but also as primary enforcement measures, A broad-
easter transgressing a standard enunciated through one of these media may
initially be restrained, for example, by a pointed letter of inquiry, an investiga-
tion followed by a warning, or a disapproving dictum in an order granting
license renewal. In view of the severity of the ultimate sanction of license
withdrawal underlying these measures, this informal regulatory technique has
proven highly effective.
-9 2
Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 112
(1944) (statement of W. S. Paley, president of CBS). Compare statement of Commis-
sioner Fly, note 12 .rupra.
89. E.g., on May 4, 1931, prior to enactment of the lottery broadcast provision, the
Federal Radio Commission, on the ground that it lacked authority to take such action,
denied a petition requesting promulgation of an order banning the broadcast of lotteries.
1 J. RADIO L. 346 (1931). Three days later the Commission issued a press release stating
that "There exists a doubt that such [lottery] broadcasts are in the public interest,"
N.Y.Times, May 8, 1931, p. 28, col. 3. The Commission later commented that "It is be-
lieved that the warning had the effect of materially limiting this class of program, and in
such instances as came to the attention of the commission after its issuance the programs
were discontinued voluntarily by the station after the matter had been brought to its at-
tention." 5 FRC ANN. REP. 9 (1931). See Caldwell, Legal Restrictions on the Contents
of Broadcast Programs, 9 Am L. REV. 229, 231 (1938).
90. See Segal, supra note 12, at 368-71; Note 47 COL. L. Rav. 1041, 1043-7 (1947).
See also WARNER, RADIO AND TEL~visiox LAw 33-7 (1948).
91. See note 89 supra. See also Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H.R. 5497, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 644-5 (1942).
92. "All it [the FCC] had to do was put out a release, even a speech by an individual
commissioner, disapproving of a particular type of program, and henceforth most or all
the stations avoided that type of program.... The threat of hearing and publicity was
enough punishment to cause broadcasters to obey the views of the committee [Commis-
sion] . . . on what constitutes good programming." Ibid.
The FCC has felt impelled to adopt this oblique mode of regulation to avoid bringing
into play the harsh sanction of license retraction, and has often requested Congress to pro-
vide it with a more moderate weapon to eliminate this necessity. E.g., Hearings before
Commnittee on Interstate Commerce on S. 814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 43-4 (1944). An un-
successful attempt was made to arm the Commission with authority to issue cease and de-
sist orders in S. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 14 (1947). The FCC has thus far been re-
luctant to make use of the declaratory ruling device made available by § 5(d) of the
Administrative Procedure Act, sitpra note 82. See Harry S. Goodman, 4 PIKE & Fiscnli
RADIO REG. 98, 99 (1948).
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Those who contend that enforcement action based on the FCC's licensing
powers must be confined to exercise of the licensing weapon are actually ac-
knowledging the Commission's authority to make use of all these measures to
inhibit the broadcast of lotteries. Only where this procedure failed would the
Commission resort to actual license reprisals.
3
Enactment of Rules
Since the only practical effect of forbidding the issuance of rules to define
the FCC's criteria for lottery broadcasts is to compel the agency to pronounce
such standards informally, it is difficult to perceive what advantage broadcast-
ers hope to gain by objecting to that aspect of the Commission's proposal 4
In the first place, formally enacted rules would provide a far more satisfactory
guide for broadcasters who must seek to adapt their program formats to new
requirements, and would eliminate much of the confusion which may result if
the Commission is obliged to spell out its standards by ad hoc determination
of lottery broadcast questions.95 And in the second place, broadcasters would
lose the protection of the procedural safeguards surrounding the enactment of
rules 8 and would forfeit whatever opportunity they may have to challenge the
Commission's criteria for lottery broadcasts prior to their actual application in
individual licensing proceedings.
0 7
93. The FCC has formally announced that it will delete a station only as a last resort.
C. Bruce McConnell, 6 F.C.C. 167, 174 (193S) ; Brooklyn Broadcasting Corp., 4 F.C.C.
521 (1937).
94. Opposition to the enactment of rules as an enforcement device under the Com-
mission's lottery broadcast proposal is not universal among broadcasters. The counsel for
the National Broadcasting Company conceded that "It is in the interest of the broad-
casters that their risks be minimized by removal of the uncertainty which exists in the
interpretation of lottery laws. Therefore, if the Commission intends to apply Section 1304
of the United States Criminal Code in its licensing proceedings, it should make mov.n in
advance, as it proposes to do, the standards which it will follow." FCC OFFiciAL Raxo.rr
OF PROCEDINGs IrN MATTER OF PROmULGATION oF RuLEs GOVERlIIG THE Bno. WnsT or
Lowmy INIFORMATION (Oct. 19, 1948).
95. The FCC itself has recognized these advantages of rule-making as a means of
defining standards. 'Ve believe that the announcement of the principles we intend to
apply in exercising our licensing power will expedite business and further the ends of
justice. . . . The formulation of a regulation in general terms is an important aid to
consistency and predictability and does not prejudice any rights of the applicant. GoA
administrative policy would seem to demand that such a statement of policy or rules and
regulations be promulgated wherever sufficient information is available upon which they
may be based." FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BRO.ADCAsTING 85 (1941). By ignoring this
counsel and continuing to rely primarily on informal modes for expounding program
standards the Commission gains a maximum of procedural flexibility and avoids the pussi-
bility of prior judicial review. See notes 97 and 99 infra. The only apparent advantage to
broadcasters is the possibility that if program standards are announced informally they
may be applied less stringently.
96. The right of interested persons to adequate notice and an opportunity to have their
views considered by the agency are guaranteed in connection with administrative promul-
gation of rules. Administrative Procedure Act §4, 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1G01 (1946).
These rights, however, do not extend to interpretative rules or statements of policy. bid.
97. The Supreme Court authorized prior review of the Chain Broadcasting Regula-
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But the broadcasters' challenge necessitates consideration of whether enact-
ment of the proposed rules would be a valid exercise of the FCC's rule-making
authority. The scope of this authority is defined by Sections 303(r) and 4(i)
of the Communications Act, which authorize the Commission to issue rules
"to carry out the provisions of this Act" and "necessary in the execution of
its functions." If jurisdiction is derived solely from the general licensing pro-
visions, the objection is encountered that, while the Commission's duty to
regard the broad effect of a license grant on the public interest may permit
consideration of lottery broadcast offenses in licensing proceedings, enactment
of the proposed rules could be construed only as a correlative attempt to en-
force a provision of the Criminal Code which the Commission has conceded it
has no direct authority to enforce, and would therefore exceed these statutory
restrictions on its rule-making power.98
The essential fallacy in this argument lies in the insistence that these rules
constitute a direct and independent measure to enforce the radio lottery pro-
vision.09 While promulgation of these rules would undoubtedly restrain most
tions in Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942). In that case
a divided Court found that the Chain Broadcasting Regulations were "orders" within the
meaning of the Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 STAT. 219, 220 (1913) as incorporated In the
Communications Act through Section 402(a), and consequently were reviewable prior to
actual application of these standards in licensing proceedings. Following the reasoning
of that decision, see note 99 infra, the lottery broadcast rules, which are to be patterned
after the Chain Broadcasting Regulations (see FCC, Supplemental Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, supra note 18, §4) might similarly be subject to prior review. The CBS
case might be distinguished, however, since the networks did not have access to licensing
proceedings through which the regulations might have been challenged.
98. "The non sequitur in the Commission's reasoning lies in its conclusion that, be-
cause it may have authority to consider violations of other statutes in passing on license
applications in individual cases, it therefore has jurisdiction to issue rules generally de-
fining what constitutes violations of those statutes. If the Commission had jurisdiction to
issue regulations under Section 1304 of the Criminal Code, it equally would have jurisdic-
tion to issue rules defining what, in its opinion, constitutes violations of other acts of
Congress such as, for instance, the Sherman Act, the Robinson-Patman Act, the various
'fair trade practices' acts, etc. Obviously, that is not the Congressional intent." ABC,
BaxF, mrpra note 28, at 26-7.
99. The Supreme Court's decision in Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States,
316 U.S. 407 (1942) (see note 97 supra), might appear to buttress this conception of rules
as an independent enforcement weapon. In reaching the novel decision that the Chain
Broadcasting Regulations were "orders" and therefore reviewable, the Court, after de-
claring that "The particular label placed upon [these regulations] is not conclusive," 316
U.S. 407, 416 (1942), observed that "numerous affiliated stations have conformed to the
[Chain Broadcasting] regulations to avoid loss of their licenses with consequent injury to
appellant [CBS network]." Id. at 418. Having determined that "The regulations are
the effective instrument by which the injury complained of is wrought," id. at 421, the
Court held that "an administrative order [which] has that effect... is reviewable
and it does not cease to be so merely because it is not certain whether the Commission will
institute proceedings to enforce the penalty incurred under its regulations for non-com-
pliance." Id. at 417-18.
Reliance on this decision to support the argument that the proposed lottery broadcast
rules would be an autonomous enforcement measure and would therefore have to rest on
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licensees from broadcasting lotteries without actual resort to license reprisals,
this deterrent effect would be achieved only because these rules would be
backed by the ultimate threat of license withdrawal. 00 In reality, then, these
rules would acquire operative significance solely because of their relation to the
Commission's licensing function' 0 ' in defining standards which vill govern
direct statutory authorization is of dubious merit for several reasons. First, the Court in
this case was merely determining whether these regulations were reviewable as "orders",
and was not concerned with their validity. Upon actual review of these regulations, the
Court upheld them merely by ascertaining that the type of conduct with which they dealt
was an appropriate subject for consideration in licensing proceedings-thus measuring
the scope of the rule-making power by the range of the licensing weapon. National Broad-
casting Company v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), see pp. 114-15 infra. Indeed,
in the NBC majority opinion, Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the dissenting opinion in
the CBS case, clearly embodied the views he expressed in that dissent: "... [The regula-
tions] are merely an announcement to the public of what the Commission intends to do in
passing upon future applications for licenses." Columbia Broadcasting System v. United
States, 316 U.S. 407, 431 (1942). ". . . [T]he regulations as such do not subject licenees
to any sanctions." Id. at 437. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 225 (1943).
Second, the Court in the CBS case conceded that the deterrent effect of these rules
was achieved through the threat of license reprisals (see above) ; but, being primarily cun-
cerned with the risk of irreparable injury, applied principles of equity to find a right of
review in the appellant. 316 U.S. 407, 415 (1942). As such, the holding can scarcely be
employed to prevent administrative rule-making with respect to matters within the prov-
ince of an agency's effective jurisdiction.
Finally, the majority opinion was clearly venturing no broad e.xplication of the nature
of administrative rules, but rather, rested its decision on a narrov, if somewhat fuzzy,
distinction. Having adopted practical deterrent effect as the test of reviewability of
administrative pronouncements, the Court must have realized that it was perilously close
to authorizing prior judicial review of all administrative regulations, if not of all policy
statements. The Court, therefore, found these regulations "peculiar" (id. at 425) in that
they were "couched in terms of command and accompanied by an announcement of
the Commission that the policy is one 'which we will follow in exercising our licensing
power... !" and were therefore "controlling alike upon the Commission and all
others whose rights may be affected by the Commission's execution of them:' Id. at 422.
Whether the imperative phraseology of the regulations is a realistic ground for distinguish-
ing them from other pronouncements of standards of broadcasting conduct seems open to
question. See dissenting opinion, 316 U.S. 407, 431-7 (1942) ; see also National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 47 F.Supp. 940, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 190
(1943). The Commission itself insisted that there was no practical distinction, pointing
out that "the applicant's right to a hearing on the question whether he does in fact
propose to operate in the public interest is fully preserved." FCC, RErro. on- Cirmu
BROADCASTING 85 (1941). In any event, the Court's holding would do no more than indi-
cate that if the proposed lottery broadcast rules were phrased in the imperative, they would
be subject to prior judicial review; mere alteration of the phrasing to provide that speci-
fied types of giveaway programs would be considered lotteries contrary to the public
interest would shield the rules from review, since there would then be no categorical state-
ment that non-compliance would result in loss of license.
100. "It is common experience that men conform their conduct to regulations by gov-
ernmental authority so as to avoid the unpleasant legal consequences which failure to con-
form entails." Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418 (1942).
101. The judicial conception of the nature and extent of the FCC's investigatory power
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the grant of broadcasting franchises. Since these are standards which the
FCC may properly apply in passing on license applications,10 2 the Commission
would clearly appear to have authority to enact these rules as a supplementary
measure contributing to the performance of its licensing function.
1°3
The narrow interpretation of the Commission's rule-making authority urged
by opponents of the proposed lottery broadcast rules is in sharp conflict with
the broad construction placed upon those powers by the Supreme Court in
National Broadcasting Company v. United States104 in which the Court upheld
the Chain Broadcasting Regulations as a valid exercise of the Commission's
rule-niaking authority. These regulations defined types of contractual rela-
tionships between stations and networks which the Commission, in view of
the public policy expressed in the anti-trust laws, would deem contrary to the
public interest in considering applications for broadcast licenses.1"* To sustain
would seem to refute the contention that the potential deterrent effect of the proposed
rules warrants artificially dissociating the rules from the licensing function in seeking
statutory authorization. The investigatory power, like the rule-making power, is to be
exercised only in connection with the provisions of the Communications Act. See id, § 403.
And, like rules, investigations have an immediate deterrent effect on the broadcasters con-
cerned. See, e.g., note 92 supra. See also Hearings before Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 5497, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 644-5 (1942). The courts, nonethe-
less, recognizing the auxiliary nature of investigation as an administrative enforcement de-
vice, have confirmed the FCC's authority to investigate any matter which might properly
be a subject for consideration in licensing proceedings. Stahlman v. FCC, 126 F.2d 124, 126
(App. D.C. 1942). See note 81 supra. There appears no substantial reason for refusing
to afford similar scope to the Commission's rule-making power.
102. Seep. 1105 supra.
103. Authority for the rules may be found in Section 4(i) of the Communications Act,
which empowers the FCC to "make such rules and regulations ... as may be neces-
sary in the execution of its functions," and in Section 4(j), which provides that "The
Commission may conduct its proceedings in such a manner as will best conduce to the
proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice."
In line with these statutory provisions, courts have afforded broad discretion to the
FCC to determine the most feasible means for discharging its basic functions. See, eg.,
Ward v. FCC, 108 F.2d 486, 491 (App.D.C. 1939). In fact, enactment of rules to define
the standards by which the qualifications of applicants for licenses will be measured has
been strongly encouraged. See Heitmeyer v. FCC, 95 F.2d 91, 98 (App.D.C. 1937).
The judicial attitude toward rule-making as an administrative device for propounding
standards of conduct within an agency's field of regulation is best expressed In SEC v.
Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) : "Since the Commission [SEC], unlike a court, does
have the ability to make new law prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making
powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of
conduct within the framework of the Holding Company Act. The function of filling in
the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-
legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future."
104. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
105. See FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 46 (1941). "The prohibitions of the
Sherman Act apply to broadcasting. The Commission, although not charged with the duty
of enforcing that law, should administer its regulatory powers with respect to broadcast-
ing in the light of the purposes which the Sherman Act was designed to achieve." See also
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223-4 (1943).
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the Chain Broadcasting Regulations, it was necessary for the Court to establish
two basic points: first, that the network arrangements denounced in the regu-
lations were valid subjects for consideration by the FCC in passing on license
applications; and second, that the Commission had authority to promulgate
rules defining the standards it would enforce -with respect to these arrange-
ments in licensing proceedings. The decision clearly hinged on the former
point.10 6 The Court found that, while Section 311 specifically empowered the
FCC to weigh convictions under the anti-trust laws in licensing proceedings,
this provision did not authorize consideration of unadjudicated infractions of
those laws.107 However, the Court held that the FCC could consider monopo-
listic activity and unfair trade practices in passing on license applications
solely on the ground that such conduct was contrary to the public interest in
the use of broadcasting facilities.10 s The fact that those activities might also
be violative of the anti-trust laws would be of significance only in serving to
confirm the Commission's judgment that such activities were socially harmful.
Having found that the specified network practices were properly subject to
scrutiny in licensing proceedings, the Court approved the promulgation of the
regulations as a "particularization of the Commission's conception of the pub-
lic interest sought to be safeguarded by Congress in enacting the Communica-
tions Act of 1934."' 'i
106. The entire opinion was essentially devoted to establishing the FCC's general au-
thority to cope with network practices. The Court did not clearly delineate between the
licensing and rule-making weapons, apparently feeling that since they served a common
regulatory purpose, their ranges were coextensive. See note 109 infra.
107. ".... [T]he Act does not explicitly say that the Commission shall have power to
deal with network practices found inimical to the public interest." National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 218-9 (1943). See note 108 in Ira.
108. "A licensee charged with practices in contravention of this standard cannot con-
tinue to hold his license merely because his conduct is also in violation of the anti-trust
laws and he has not yet been proceeded against and convicted. By clarifying in Section
311 the scope of the Commission's authority in dealing with persons convicted of violating
the anti-trust laws, Congress can hardly be deemed to have limited the concept of 'public
interest' so as to exclude all considerations relating to monopoly and unreasonable re-
straints upon commerce. Nothing in the provisions or history of the Act lends support
to the inference that the Commission was denied the power to refuse a license to a station
not operating in the 'public interest' merely because its misconduct happened to be an un-
convicted violation of the anti-trust laws." Id. at 223. See also the district court opinion in
this case, 47 F.Supp. 940, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
109. 319 U.S. 190, 218 (1943). Section 303(i) of the Comunications Act empowers
the FCC "to make special regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain broad-
casting." If this provision had been accepted on its face, there could scarcely have been
much question as to the validity of the Chain Broadcasting Regulations. The Court, how-
ever, found that this provision alone would not support the regulations, since it did not
bring network practices within the scope of the Commission's licensing power, which was
the heart of the regulatory scheme. See note 107 sipra. These practices were drawn
within range of the licensing weapon by construing the provisions requiring the FCC
to protect the public interest in radio as granting "not niggardly but expansive powers."
Id. at 219. See also note 108 supra. The analysis of Section 303(i) vas devoted to dis-
pelling the notion that this provision restricted the otherwise broad powers of the Commis-
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The proposed lottery broadcast rules may be distinguished from the Chain
Broadcasting Regulations, in that the former define a type of broadcasting ac-
tivity which the FCC apparently will consider detrimental to the public interest
purely because it is inconsistent with a criminal statute,110 while the latter
stigmatize certain network practices primarily on the basis of an independent
determination by the Commission that such practices are injurious to the pub-
lic."' But this distinction would seem relevant only in determining whether
the broadcast of lotteries is a proper subject for consideration in passing on
license applications. Since the FCC has firm grounds on which to assert
authority to weigh unadjudicated violations of the lottery broadcast provision
sion to only the technical and financial aspects of chain broadcasting. See ida. t 220-1.
Having ascertained that network arrangements were subject to regulation by the FCC,
the Court never specifically considered the possibility that such regulation could only be
achieved through exercise of the licensing power and not through the enactment of regu-
lations amplifying the standards which would govern the use of the licensing weapon.
While not made explicit by the Court, it would appear that the specific act of issuing the
regulations was considered to rest on Section 303(i) rather than on Section 303(r), the
general rule-making provision. However, the Court emphasized that the FCC derived
equally broad powers from both sections. After stating that "Congress endowed the
Communications Commission with comprehensive powers to promote and realize the vast
potentialities of radio," the Court cited both Sections 303(i) and 303(r) as sources of
these expansive powers, and indicated that such powers stemmed from these provisions
"individually and collectively.'" Id. at 217 (emphasis added).
To contend that, while the FCC may control both network practices and lottery
broadcasts through its licensing power, rules may not be issued with respect to the latter
because lottery broadcasts were not specifically enumerated as subject to the rule-makling
power, would be to create the very type of functionless distinction the Court vigorously
decried. ". . . [G]eneralities empty of all concrete considerations of the actual bearing
of regulations promulgated by the Commission to the subject matter entrusted to It, can-
not strike down exercises of power by the Commission, While Congress did not give the
Commission unfettered discretion to regulate all phases of the radio industry, it did not
frustrate the purposes for which the Communications Act of 1934 was brought into being
by attempting an itemized catalogue of the specific manifestations of the general prob-
lems for the solution of which it was establishing a regulatory agency." Id. at 219.
110. See FCC, Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 18, §§ 2, 3.
See also p. 1106 mtpra.
111. "While many of the network practices raise serious questions under the antitrust
laws, our jurisdiction does not depend on a showing that they do in fact constitute a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws .... We are issuing these regulations because we have found
that the network practices prevent the maximum utilization of radio facilities in the
public interest." FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTIN 83 n.3 (1941) (quoted with ap-
proval in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223-4 (1943), See
also note 108 .supra.
The network arrangements proscribed by the Chain Broadcasting Regulations might
well have violated the penal statutes forbidding monopolistic activity and unfair trade
practices-and, indeed, this fact obviously received some consideration from the FCC. See
note 105 supra. But the effect of such practices in restricting the use of broadcasting facili-
ties was a matter which the FCC was especially equipped to observe and appraise. Thus,
rather than relying directly on the Congressional determination that such practices were
harmful to the public interest, the Commission grounded the regulations on its own judg-
ment as to the effect of these practices on the public interest. But the statutory provisions
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in licensing proceedings,"' the NBC decision would appear to affirm the Com-
mission's right to promulgate rules enunciating the standards it will apply with
respect to such conduct.
In seeking to avert the objection that enactment of the proposed rules would
exceed its authority, the FCC may contend that the rules are entirely "inter-
pretative" in nature. So denominated, the Commission might aver either that
enactment of these rules need not be grounded on specific statutory authoriza-
tion, or that their promulgation need not rest on any statutory base.11 3 Al-
though these lines of attack might have technical merit, it would appear ine.-
pedient for the Commission to ensnare itself in a perplexing doctrinal web u'2
by placing reliance on the tag "interpretative". In the first place, as has been
indicated, there are firm grounds for issuance of the proposed rules without
resort to this argument. In the second place, any fear that a court might re-
quire specific authorization for the rules would seem groundless. Where, as in
the case of the FCC, rule-making power has been delegated in general terms
imposing upon the FCC a broad responsibility for protecting the public interest in radio
broadcasting can hardly be read to require such independent judgment by the Commission
where Congress has expressed its own judgment as to the effect of particular types of
broadcasting activity on the public interest.
112. See p. 1105 szpra.
113. That the Commission may intend to advance this argument is suggested by its
pointed insistence that "These proposed rules ... are entirely interpretative in nature
and do not purport to add to or detract from the statutory prohibition impfed by Con-
gress." FCC, Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 18, § S. Twio
objectives may be sought in urging the view that the rules are purely interpretative.
First, as in the CBS case, the FCC may seek to avert prior judicial review of the rules.
See note 99 supra. And second, more pertinent to the instant discussion, the Commission
may hope thereby to induce a reviewing court to apply more liberal standards in determin-
ing whether the promulgation of these rules is within the agency's rule-maling authority.
Two lines of approach might be adopted in connection v.ith this second point. First, if
the Commission expected that specific authorization would be required if the rules were
not classified as interpretative, it might gain access to implied authority by affixing that
tag. See Davis, Administrative Rules-Isterprctalz'c, Lcgislativ and Retroa ''e, 57
YALE L. J. 919, 928-34 (1948). But it seems unnecessary to wrangle over labels on this
score. Seep. 1117infra.
Second, the FCC might urge that if the proposed rules are interpretative in nature,
statutory authorization is not required to support their enactment. Several cases may be
cited to uphold this argument. See Davis, supra, at 928-34. Section 9(a) of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act might also be construed to lend weight to this contention. Se note
114 infra. To argue that the promulgation of interpretative rules need not be grounded
on statutory authorization to issue such pronouncements would not, of course, be to argue
that the FCC may regulate matters beyond the defined scope of its jurisdiction. The regu-
latory policy expounded in such rules would be subject to judicial review when imple-
mented by the Commission in licensing proceedings.
While this conception of the legal consequences of labelling a rule as interpretative
may be sound, it appears that the FCC would have difficulty persuading a reviewing court
to tag the rules as interpretative. See notes 114 and 118 infra.
114. While federal statutes and court decisions recognize different categories of ad-
ministrative rules, they fail to provide a sufficient basis for distinguishing betv:een these
classes or for determining, with any degree of certainty, the different legal consequences
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encompassing the full range of the agency's regulatory jurisdiction, the distinc-
tion between express and implied authorization becomes virtually meaning-
less.1 5 And in any event, it seems clear that administrative rules, however
labelled, may rest upon either specific or implied statutory authority. 10 And
finally, while it would be of advantage to the Commission to free this type of
rule completely from the requirement of statutory authorization, the unlikeli-
hood of success seems sufficiently great to discourage the attempt in this in-
stance. For this argument would encounter an imposing barrier in the NBC
decision, in which the Supreme Court held that the Chain Broadcasting Regu-
which result from attaching a particular label. The Administrative Procedure Act, .rupri
note 82, refers to "interpretative rules" and "rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice" in Section 4(a), and exempts both of these classes of rules from procedural re-
quirements applicable to rules not within these categories. In Section 3(a) it distinguishes
between "substantive rules" and "statements of general policy or interpretations formu-
lated by the agency for the guidance of the public." The Act, however, offers no deflnition
of these different types of rules. Professor K. C. Davis distinguishes between "legislative"
and "interpretative" rules, and points out that "According to the theory, legislative rules
are the product of a power to create new law, and interpretative rules are the product
of interpretation of previously existing law. Legislative rules may change the law, but
interpretative rules merely clarify the law they interpret." Davis, supra note 113, at 929.
Rules defining agency procedure would appear to constitute a third category.
"Legislative" rules are generally held valid only when grounded on express or im-
plied statutory authority, when the proper procedure has been followed in enacting then,
and when there is substantial evidence to support the reasonableness of the action. Id.
at 931. When these requirements are met, the theory is that "reviewing courts may no
more substitute their judgment on policies declared by legislative rules than they may
substitute their judgment on policies declared by statutes." Id. at 929. On the other hand,
agency power to issue interpretative rules has often been considered inherent rather
than dependent on statutory grant. Id. at 930. Judicial control has been retained, however,
since "courts often deem themselves free to substitute their judgment as to content of
interpretative rules." Id. at 929.
The Administrative Procedure Act might be construed to permit the issuance of in-
terpretative rules without statutory authorization. Section 9(a) provides that "No...
substantivc rule ... [shall] be issued except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency
and as authorized by law." (Emphasis added.) The Act specifically recognizes interpreta-
tive rules as a unique category, and in Section 3(a) appears to differentiate such rules
from substantive rules. It might be argued, therefore, that, by exclusion, Section 9(a)
exempts interpretative rules from the requirement of statutory authorization which it
imposes on substantive rules. But while the wording of the statute may serve this argu-
ment, the House committee report on the Act indicates an intent that Section 9(a) have
general application to administrative actions including all types of agency pronouncements.
H. R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
115. The House-committee reporting the Administrative Procedure Act explicitly
pointed out that rule-making power may be delegated to an administrative agency in either
specific or general terms. H. R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). The grant
of such powers to the FCC is of the latter type. See p. 1112 supra. The very generality
of the grant would seem to preclude the possibility of requiring specific authorization for
the enactment of rules.
116. See Davis, supra note 113, at 929.
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lations, to which the FCC has analogized the proposed rules,"' were legislative
in character and had to rest upon a statutory base." 8
CONCLUSION
In view of the sharp opposition encountered by the FCCs lottery broadcast
proposal, it is interesting to note the essentially conservative character of this
plan.
While suggesting a new departure in program control, the FCC's proposal
does not represent so much an extension of the Commission's supervisory
powers as an attempt to close a gap which has developed well behind the outer-
most frontiers of the area over which it has exerted control. Since the FCC
has utilized its licensing powers to curb programming practices merely because
the Commission has deemed them detrimental to the public interest,110 it would
hardly seem a radical innovation for the custodian of the publicly owned air
waves to check the broadcast of programs which Congress has branded as
117. FCC, Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 18, § 4.
118. While the Supreme Court, in reviewing the Chain Broadcasting Regulations in
the NBC case, tacitly rejected the characterization of those regulations advanced in the
CBS opinion, see note 99 supra, it nevertheless held that "Our duty is at an end when we
find that the action of the Commission was based upon findings supported by evidence,
and was made pursuant to authority grantcd by Congress ... The responsibility belongs
to the Congress for the valid grant of legislative authority and to the Commission for its
exercise." 319 U.S. 190,224 (1942). (Emphasis added).
Although the argument that interpretative rules need not be based on statutory au-
thorization might have merit, it would seem difficult for the Commission, in the face of
this holding, to convince a court that the lottery broadcast rules were interpretative. The
FCC might, however, attempt to distinguish the proposed lottery broadcast rules from the
Chain Broadcasting Regulations in several ways. First, the Commission may cast the
rules in a different form than the regulations, see note 99 supra, and attempt to establish
that the mandatory nature of the regulations was a vital factor in the NBC as well as the
CBS case. Second, it might point out that the Chain Broadcasting Regulations w-.ere en-
acted on the basis of an independent study of the effects of netvork practices on broad-
casting service and did not purport to rest solely on a legislative prohibition, while the
proposed rules apparently do. See p. 1106 supra. Consequently, the FCC might argue
these rules are more clearly interpretative of existing law, and do not create broadcast
standards which have not already been enunciated in fairly specific terms by statute. Fi-
nally, the Commission might contend, as it did unsuccessfully in the CBS case, that there is
no operative distinction between such rules and a press release containing the same in-
formation. Rather, it might urge, the difference lies only in the label affixed and in the
consequences courts attach to those labels. See, e.g., Hearst Radio v. FCC 167 F2d 225
(App. D.C. 1948) (court held that the Commission's Blue Book, see note 15 mslra, defin-
ing standards of program service to be applied in licensing proceedings, were not rules).
It might be pointed out that the Supreme Court in the CBS case, 316 U.S. 407, 422 (1942),
distinguished the Chain Broadcasting Regulations from a press release on the grounds
that the regulations were "avowedly adopted in the exercise of that [rule-making] power"
and were "couched in terms of command!' The FCC might suggest that both grounds are
inconsistent with the Court's expressed unconcern with form rather than substance. See
note 99 supra.
119. See notes 12 and 16 supra.
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illicit. Indeed, unless the statutory proscription against lottery broadcasts is to
be rendered impotent, such action seems imperative
12 0
Particularly difficult to comprehend is the objection to the enactment of
rules as an enforcement device, since broadcasters themselves have been the
harshest critics of the Commission's oblique technique of regulation "by the
raised eyebrow."12' This challenge may be merely a makeweight advanced in
the hope either that it will further discourage the already hesitant Commis-
sion, or that if the agency can at least be induced to propound its lottery
broadcast standards informally, it will apply them less assiduously. It seems
likely that once the FCC's authority and determination to undertake admin-
istrative action to bar lottery broadcasts are established, many broadcasters will
heartily indorse the formal promulgation of rules delineating this new policy., "2
Despite the failure of Congress specifically to impose responsibility for ef-
fectuating the radio lottery provision on the FCC, there appears ample support
for the Commission's view that it is charged with this duty, and that enactment
of the proposed rules would be an appropriate means of fulfilling this obliga-
tion.
120. See note 40 supra.
121. Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 814, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess. 112 (1944). See also Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Conm.
merce on H. R. 5497, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 645 (1942).
122. See, e.g., note 94 supra.
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